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Return to Nominal EVA – Background 
• During US EVA 35 in January 2016, one of 
the spacesuits allowed enough water to 
enter the helmet that the EVA was 
terminated
– It is impossible to determine how much 
water was put into the helmet, but 
estimates range from 65cc to almost 500cc
– A Problem Resolution Team (PRT) was 
convened, and that team’s investigation 
concluded following ground testing of the 
hardware
– Probable failure scenario: High latent loads 
and cold EVA conditions may have created 
high levels of condensate which may have 
overwhelmed the sublimator (which already 
had blocked supplemental slurper holes), 
and high metabolic rates may have driven 
additional moisture off the METOX further 
adding to the load on the system
Tim Kopra in SEMU 3011 during US EVA 35
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Return to Nominal EVA – Residual Risk
• The January 2016 incident demonstrated that the hazard controls 
and safety features implemented after US EVA 23 are sufficient to 
protect crew safety in a water-in-the-helmet scenario
• The likelihood of terminating an EVA due to sublimator carryover 
from a spacesuit without failures is now understood to be higher
– The likelihood of terminating and leaving the ISS in an unanalyzed 
configuration is now understood to be higher
– Critical points in each EVA timeline are identified ahead of time, and 
impacts to hardware and mission objectives are evaluated assuming 
that the EVA may be terminated at each critical point
• Other EVA system failures have all been dispositioned with 
sufficient rationale to proceed with EVA operations
• EVA Non-Compliance Reports (NCRs) document accepted risks of 
continuing to operate this suit in the ISS environment
• Each on-orbit spacesuit has unique residual risk from system failures, 
waivers, on-orbit maintenance, and/or trends in system behavior
 There are no technical liens against the use of any on-orbit spacesuit
